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ABSTRACT 
The European Monetary System (EMS) created a policy standard—exchange 
rate stability—which domestic constituents could use to evaluate their 
government’s policy choices. Domestic social coalitions in favor of 
macroeconomic discipline could punish governments that violated this 
standard. I test the argument that devaluations within the EMS 
negatively affect the devaluing government’s approval ratings by using 
the London School/Hendry approach to model the approval ratings of the 
French prime minister and president from 1981–1992. The results 
indicate that devaluations did hurt the government’s approval ratings. 
I contend that the domestic political cost for violating the focal 
point of exchange rate stability provided member governments with an 
additional incentive to pursue disciplined economic policies throughout 
the 1980s. The incentive to avoid currency devaluations also helped to 
shape the response to the twin shocks of German monetary unification 
and the Maastricht Treaty. Since realignment would have damaged their 
domestic popularity, member governments were unwilling to adjust their 
parities, leading to the collapse of the EMS. 
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EXCHANGE RATE STABILITY AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY  
IN THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM 
 
Throughout the 1980s, the European Monetary System provided explicit 
guidelines for member states to manage their currencies. I argue that 
the rules of the EMS framed the issues surrounding monetary policy, 
shaping the way in which domestic publics evaluated their government’s 
policy performance. In particular, the policy standard of exchange rate 
stability emerged as a focal point for domestic social coalitions in 
favor of macroeconomic discipline. These social coalitions looked to 
exchange rate stability since it provided an easily observable standard 
to evaluate policy and because maintenance of exchange rate stability 
had relatively predictable consequences for macroeconomic performance. 
These social coalitions could, therefore, punish governments that 
violated this standard. I evaluate the argument using the French case, 
testing whether devaluations negatively affected the government’s 
approval ratings. 
The possibility of electoral punishment for a devaluation altered 
politicians’ political incentives over monetary policy and exchange 
rate cooperation. The domestic political cost for violating the focal 
point of exchange rate stability provided member governments with an 
additional incentive to pursue disciplined economic policies throughout 
the 1980s. The incentive to avoid currency devaluations also helped to 
shape the response to the twin shocks of German monetary unification 
and the Maastricht Treaty. Since realignment would have damaged their 
domestic popularity, member governments were unwilling to adjust their 
parities, leading to the collapse of the EMS. 
The European Monetary System 
Instituted in 1979, the EMS established an adjustable peg exchange rate 
system between most European Community member states and a floating 
rate with countries outside the system. The EMS agreement contained 
explicit rules governing exchange rates, intervention in exchange 
markets, and currency realignments. Each member state agreed to 
maintain the market exchange rate of its currency within fixed margins 
above or below a bilateral central rate,1 usually within 2.25 percent 
around the official rate.2
The rules for currency realignments required that countries requesting 
a realignment appeal to the Monetary Committee, composed of officials 
from member state finance ministries and central banks, to negotiate 
the size and timing of the adjustment. In practice, the Committee 
always limited the size of a devaluation, making it smaller than the 
proposal made by the devaluing government. Additionally, the upper 
bound of the new parity always fell within the boundaries of the old 
parity, as a deterrent to speculators (DeGrauwe 1992). Finally, the 
Monetary Committee sometimes placed pressure on the devaluing 
government to tighten its economic policies to lend credibility to the 
new parity. 
Despite the ability for national governments to pursue divergent 
monetary policies within the EMS, the EMS experience was marked by a 
1 
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gradual convergence of monetary policy outcomes across member states. 
Figure 1 illustrates the average annual inflation rate for selected EMS 
member states since 1981. In each member state, inflation fell 
throughout the early 1980s and remained relatively stable in the latter 
half of the decade. Germany was the system’s low inflation leader 
throughout most of the decade. Since German monetary unification in 
1990, however, other EMS countries, including France, have outperformed 
Germany. 
As a result of this macroeconomic convergence, the frequency of 
currency realignments within the EMS decreased (Gros and Thygesen 
1992). During the first four years of operation (1979–1983), seven 
currency realignments occurred, culminating with a general realignment 
in March 1983. By the end of the period, the French franc had lost over 
30 percent of its value against the D–mark. The next four years saw 
only four devaluations. And, unlike earlier realignments, speculative 
unrest in currency markets, rather than macroeconomic divergence, 
precipitated the final realignment in January 1987. From 1987 until the 
crash of the EMS in September 1992, no devaluations occurred. 
 
Figure 1. Average Annual Inflation Rates for EMS Member States. 
The EMS as a Coordinating Device 
I argue that the exchange rate stability within EMS emerged as a focal 
point for domestic publics. Compliance with exchange rate stability had 
predictable macroeconomic consequences that complemented the policy 
goals of social coalitions in favor of macroeconomic discipline—that 
is, greater fiscal responsibility and price stability. And, since the 
EMS provided an easily observable standard, this social coalition could 
punish governments that violated exchange rate stability, changing the 
government’s political incentives over monetary policy and exchange 
rate cooperation.3 This section considers the economic consequences of 
fixed exchange rates in the EMS, the preferences of different sectors, 
and the monitorability of exchange rate movements in the EMS to explain 
why exchange rate stability emerged as a focal point. 
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Adherence to a fixed exchange rate implies a loss of monetary policy 
autonomy. According to the Mundell–Fleming model, countries can attain 
only two of the three following conditions: capital mobility, fixed 
exchange rates, or national policy autonomy. During the 1980s, both 
technological advances and regulatory liberalization of the financial 
sector throughout Europe dramatically increased the volume of 
international capital movement (Goodman and Pauly 1993; Sandholtz 
1993). In a world of capital mobility, real interest rates must be the 
same across borders. EMS member governments, therefore, had to mimic 
the economic policies of the most disciplined country to maintain a 
fixed exchange rate, losing the ability to manipulate policy for 
domestic policy objectives. In practical terms, member states had to 
match the Germany’s monetary discipline if they wished to maintain the 
exchange rate. 
As a result of the differential rates of inflation across EMS member 
states, the commitment to fixed (nominal) exchange rates implied a 
relatively appreciated (real) exchange rate against the D–mark. This 
appreciation reduced aggregate demand generally, dampened economic 
growth, and worsened the current account balance. The appreciation also 
affected the relative prices of tradable and nontradable goods within 
each member state, raising the domestic prices of nontradable goods and 
services relative to the domestic price of tradables. 
Devaluation offers relief from the macroeconomic pressures brought 
on by this real appreciation. By making exports cheaper and increasing 
demand for domestically produced import substitutes, devaluation can 
produce temporary improvements in employment and the current account 
(Cukierman 1992; Krugman and Obstfeld 1991). In the long-term, however, 
devaluation does not alter demand or supply conditions, instead 
producing only a proportional increase in the price level. Devaluation, 
therefore, indicates the government’s economic policies were more 
expansionary than the country’s key trading partners. 
These macroeconomic and distributional consequences shape the 
preferences of various economic sectors over a fixed exchange rate 
commitment (Frieden 1994; 1991). International traders and investors as 
well as export producers who compete on nonprice dimensions value the 
stability of the exchange rate over domestic policy autonomy. 
Commitment to a fixed exchange rate implies greater predictability in 
foreign trade and exchange, reducing the riskiness of their 
transactions. Devaluations, however, introduce uncertainty about the 
exchange rate. In contrast, producers of tradable goods that compete 
primarily on price—either exporters or import competitors—favor a 
flexible exchange rate and a weak currency. Devaluation helps them 
compete with imports or in export markets.  
Producers of nontradable goods have more ambivalent preferences over 
the commitment to a fixed exchange rate. Although the relative price 
effects of a relatively appreciated currency benefit them, nontradables 
place more emphasis on pursuing domestic policy objectives rather than 
maintaining a fixed exchange rate. Exchange rate volatility has few 
direct consequences for them. Instead, their domestic macroeconomic 
goals determine their stance toward the exchange rate commitment. If 
nontradables desire policies, which differ from potential partners in 
an exchange rate regime, then they will oppose a fixed exchange rate. 
But if nontradables have policy goals, which are similar to those 
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potential partners, they may look to a fixed exchange rate commitment 
as a way to insure that their government achieves those goals. In the 
EMS, a commitment to a fixed exchange rate with Germany implied more 
disciplined monetary and fiscal policies domestically. Consequently, 
producers in the nontradables sector who were exasperated with the high 
inflation of the late 1970s could consider the government’s ability to 
maintain a fixed exchange rate as an indicator of the government’s 
overall macroeconomic policy discipline.4
In the context of the EMS, devaluations and exchange rate stability 
provided an easily monitorable standard with which to evaluate the 
government’s monetary policy decisions. Currency realignments were a 
media event. Newspapers and television covered the negotiations between 
the devaluing member state and the Monetary Committee. The discrete and 
sometimes dramatic nature of a devaluation focused attention on the 
government’s economic policies (Alt 1991). Additionally, the media 
emphasis on devaluations meant that the public did not have to monitor 
the government’s policy continuously. Instead, they could have 
confidence that the absence of a devaluation signaled that the 
government’s macroeconomic policy was dedicated to the goals of price 
stability. Devaluation, on the other hand, sent a clear signal to the 
contrary. 
Even in the absence of devaluation, however, the currency bands of 
the EMS provided a baseline with which to judge exchange rate 
movements. Newspapers and television throughout Europe regularly report 
exchange rates, often emphasizing the currency’s standing against the 
D–mark. Sharp swings in the exchange rate or consistent trends in 
exchange rate movements toward one of the bands provided information 
about the government’s policy choices. Without the currency bands 
around the bilateral rates within the EMS, the public lacked a common, 
observable standard with which to assess the movements in the exchange 
rate. 
Exchange rate stability within the EMS, therefore, became a focal 
point for domestic publics. Maintenance of exchange rate stability had 
relatively predictable consequences for macroeconomic performance and 
it provided an observable standard to evaluate policy. Within EMS 
member states, domestic social coalitions in favor of macroeconomic 
discipline—internationally oriented actors, some exporters, and 
nontradables—soon realized that exchange rate movements signaled their 
government’s monetary policy stance, quickly equating their goals of 
fiscal responsibility and price stability with exchange rate stability. 
A devaluation raised questions about the government’s commitment to 
macroeconomic discipline. 
Devaluation also hurts the government’s overall credibility. To 
prevent currency speculation, a government has to issue assurances that 
it would maintain the currency’s parity. After a devaluation, however, 
the government must justify the decision to devalue with its earlier 
defense of the exchange rate bands. These policy “flip-flops” raise 
doubt about the government’s trustworthiness. 
Since these domestic social coalitions could monitor their 
government’s policy choices and punish the government electorally if it 
violated the standard of exchange rate stability, member state 
governments had short-term political incentives to maintain their 
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exchange rate parity, helping to maintain governments’ policy 
discipline. 
Government Accountability in the EMS:  
An Empirical Examination 
To test the relationship between devaluations in the EMS, economic 
outcomes, and government accountability, I examine the relationship 
between government approval ratings and monetary policy in France. 
Specifically, I test whether devaluations negatively affected the 
government’s approval ratings. 
The French case is important for several reasons. First, the French 
rejection of statist economic management in favor of macroeconomic 
discipline is representative of a larger trend throughout Europe. 
Although most observers point to Mitterrand’s sudden shift to economic 
“rigueur” as the turning point for French economic policy, Mitterrand’s 
U-turn actually represented a continuation of major reforms initiated 
under his predecessors. By the mid-1980s, French policymakers had 
abolished their system of credit controls and established broader and 
deeper financial markets, culminating with the adoption of monetary 
policy mechanisms based on indirect instruments designed to influence 
interest rates (Loriaux 1991). 
Second, France plays a major role in the European Union. During the 
1970s and 1980s, France provided other member states with an 
alternative to the German economic model. France’s acceptance of 
macroeconomic discipline reinvigorated Europe’s development, sparking 
the internal market program, clearing the way for the “hardening” of 
the EMS in the late 1980s, and shaping the groundwork for monetary 
union (McNamara 1995; Sandholtz 1993). It is important, therefore, to 
understand how European institutions interacted with French domestic 
politics to influence the Europe-wide policy consensus in support of 
macroeconomic discipline. 
The French Experience in the EMS  
France was a founding member of the EMS in 1979. After the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, France had participated in 
the European Exchange Rate System, commonly called the Snake, a loose 
agreement to align exchange rates among European countries. France, 
however, left the Snake in 1974 after the first oil shock. It rejoined 
the Snake in 1975 only to exit a second time a few months later in 
March 1976. As part of his economic austerity plan in the late 1970s, 
Prime Minister Raymond Barre attached great importance to a more stable 
exchange rate with Germany, France’s largest trading partner. Looking 
to formalize exchange rate cooperation at the European level, President 
Giscard negotiated the broad outlines of the EMS with German Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt (Goodman 1992; Loriaux 1991; Ludlow 1982). 
Shortly after the initiation of the EMS, the Socialist party entered 
office with a mandate for economic expansion. Undertaken during a 
global recession, however, these reflationary policies immediately 
increased inflation, worsened the trade balance, and caused capital 
flight (Sachs and Wyplosz 1986). These factors combined to place strong 
downward pressure on the franc within the EMS At first, the Socialist 
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government chose not to devalue, instead raising interest rates and 
tightening currency controls. By September 1981, however, the pressure 
to devalue was overwhelming. Anticipating an upswing in the 
international economy, Mitterrand and his prime minister, Mauroy, did 
not tighten monetary policy significantly in conjunction with the 
devaluation. The French economic expansion and the global recession, 
however, combined to send the trade deficit soaring, placing further 
pressure on the franc. The Socialist government devalued a second time 
in June 1982, imposing a four-month wage and price freeze and making 
budget cuts to prevent further economic deterioration. 
The third devaluation, in March 1983, represented the turning point 
of the Socialist economic program. The pressure on the franc had caused 
deep divisions within the party and the government over France’s 
continued participation in the EMS (Cameron 1996; Frieden 1994; Oatley 
1994; Blanchard and Muet 1993; Goodman 1992; Loriaux 1991; Sachs and 
Wyplosz 1986). Critics argued that remaining within the EMS would 
prevent the Socialists from pursuing their domestic policy agenda. But, 
by 1983, many in the government realized that exiting the system would 
significantly weaken France’s economic position, increase the foreign 
debt and, through higher import prices, increase inflation. 
Additionally, France would lose the cooperation of its ex-partners in 
the EMS. Reserves were already dangerously low and defending the franc 
outside the EMS would have required raising interest rates to all time 
highs (Loriaux 1991). After intense debate, the government announced a 
policy of economic “rigueur” in conjunction with the devaluation, 
raising taxes, cutting spending, limiting wage gains, and imposing 
controls on foreign transactions. 
The decision to remain within the system had not only economic, but 
also political implications. Opposition to remaining in the EMS had 
come from the left wing of the Socialist party and its coalition 
partner, the Communist party. The Communist party appealed to blue 
collar workers in manufacturing industries—precisely those in the 
tradables sector hurt by the exchange rate commitment. By pursuing 
economic “rigueur,” Mitterrand attempted to reshape the social 
coalition supporting the Socialist government, rejecting a focus on 
blue collar constituents and reaching out to middle-class professionals 
in the nontradables sector (Frieden 1994; Loriaux 1991). As part of 
this attempt to appeal to a new centrist social coalition, he elevated 
the technocratic wing of the Socialist party, including Fabius and 
Delors, to important leadership positions. 
The next devaluation occurred in April 1986, a month after 
legislative elections returned the center-right to government, starting 
the period of cohabitation between Socialist President Mitterrand and 
Conservative Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. The realignment was carried 
out to give the new government room to maneuver. The government also 
announced steps to reduce the budget deficit and to continue the 
relaxation of capital controls, a policy initiated under the previous 
government. 
The final devaluation came in a general realignment in January 1987. 
Officially, it was claimed that speculative unrest in the currency 
markets, rather than a divergence of member states’ economies, had made 
the realignment necessary. The U.S. dollar had fallen drastically 
throughout the latter half of 1986. Outflows of funds from the dollar 
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raised the value of the D–mark within the EMS. At the same time, 
student strikes and unrest contributed to downward pressure on the 
franc. French monetary authorities were unable to maintain the value of 
the franc through intervention. 
After January 1987, however, no realignments occurred in the EMS. 
Instead, the Socialist government, returned to office in 1988, decided 
to make thefranc fort (strong franc) the centerpiece of its economic 
policy. By 1991, inflation in France was even lower than in Germany—an 
achievement trumpeted by the government. At the same time, the 
Socialists’ monetary discipline exacerbated a terrible recession. 
Hypotheses 
I expect devaluations, in general, to hurt the government’s short-term 
approval ratings. Each devaluation will, however, have different 
effects. For example, French policymakers did not tighten monetary and 
fiscal policy in conjunction with the first devaluation in 1981. 
Therefore, we should not expect that devaluation to affect approval 
ratings as much as devaluations that were accompanied by austerity 
policies, including the 1982 and 1983 devaluations. The 1986 
devaluation came immediately after the election that placed the 
Chirac’s center-right government in office. Consequently, the 
government could not be held responsible for the devaluation. The 1987 
devaluation presents an interesting test. Analysts attribute the 
January 1987 realignment to financial speculation. If that is the case, 
we might expect that the public would hold the government less 
accountable for the devaluation. On the other hand, if the 1987 
devaluation hurts the government’s popularity, it would indicate that 
the public punished the government for violating the focal point of 
exchange rate stability, regardless of the causes of the devaluation. 
Finally, due to cohabitation, we should not expect Mitterrand to be 
held accountable for the 1986 and 1987 devaluations. 
Macroeconomic conditions also influence government approval ratings 
(Lewis–Beck 1988; Smyth and Dua 1988; Chappell and Keech 1985; Hibbs 
1982). I expect both unemployment and inflation to have a negative 
association with government approval. Inflation is sometimes argued to 
have an ambiguous effect on approval ratings, since unanticipated 
inflation may produce temporary improvements in real economic 
variables. But unanticipated inflation distorts the price mechanism. 
Economic agents cannot be sure whether price signals represent changes 
in their relative price or changes in the general price level, creating 
uncertainty about their real position and preventing them from planning 
into the future (Lucas 1972). This confusion results in the 
misallocation of resources and keeps growth away from its underlying 
equilibrium path. Consequently, I argue that voters will be hostile to 
inflation, particularly at higher levels. 
I also test for partisan differences in accountability for 
macroeconomic outcomes. Left and right governments differ in their 
economic policy goals (Hibbs 1982; Havrilesky 1987; Alesina and Sachs 
1988). Left governments are traditionally more concerned with 
employment and wealth redistribution. Right governments place inflation 
and tax reduction at the center of their agendas. Voters are likely to 
hold parties responsible for their party agendas (Hibbs 1982). Right 
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parties, therefore, will be held accountable for inflationary outcomes 
while Left parties are judged by unemployment. I expect the Socialist 
party to be held more accountable for unemployment than the center-
right Chirac government. Additionally, increases in inflation should 
hurt the approval ratings of the Chirac government more than the 
Socialist government. 
Data 
I examined the approval ratings of both the French prime minister and 
President Mitterrand from the second quarter of 1981, the beginning of 
the Socialists’ tenure, until the end of 1992, just after the Italian 
and British withdrawal from the system. The approval data are from 
Gallup France/Institut Francais d’Opinion Publique. The dependent 
variable is the quarterly change in the (logged) percentage of 
respondents answering favorably to the question: “Are you satisfied or 
dissatisfied with X as prime minister (president)?”5 Monthly data were 
averaged over each quarter. 
The independent variables consist of a mix of economic data and 
political dummy variables. Quarterly economic data for inflation and 
unemployment were drawn from OECD Main Economic Indicators: Historical 
Statistics. Inflation is the quarterly change in the (logged) average 
annual inflation rate as measured by the implicit price deflator. 
Unemployment is the quarterly change in the (logged) rate of 
unemployment. Both inflation and unemployment were multiplied by a 
dummy variable for the period of cohabitation, 1986:2–1988:1, to test 
for partisan differences during cohabitation. Additionally, inflation 
was multiplied by a dummy variable for the change in monetary operating 
procedures (i.e., the abolition of credit controls), from 1987:1 until 
the end of the data sample (inflation*post-1987).6 I used a dummy 
variable for each devaluation, coded one in 1981:4, 1982:2, 1983:1, 
1986:2, and 1987:1. 
I included dummy variables for legislative and presidential 
elections in the respective estimations. I also included a dummy 
variable for prime ministerial appointments not due to an election, 
covering the appointments of Fabius (1984), Cresson (1991), and 
Beregovoy (1992). Because the approval of each new appointment differed 
(notably the intense unpopularity of Cresson), I included specific 
dummy variables to examine their individual effects. 
Methodology 
I employ an econometric modeling strategy popularly known as the London 
School/Hendry approach (Hendry 1995; Granato 1991). This strategy 
includes a General-to-Simple specification search, a battery of 
diagnostic tests, tests for weak exogeneity, tests for dynamic 
specification (cointegration), and reduction theory. This approach to 
modeling allows the analyst to construct and test models based on 
theoretical criteria alone, rather than by correcting poorly behaved 
residuals. Additionally, this approach directly addresses the issues of 
parameter constancy and dynamic specification as well as the usual 
problems of serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, etc. 
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Parameter constancy over the entire data sample is necessary for 
valid inferences on hypothesis testing. Weakly exogenous models 
necessarily have constant parameters. Weak exogeneity implies that 
there are no cross-equation restrictions between a model for the 
process generating a regressor and the model for the endogenous 
variable (Engle, Hendry, and Richard 1983). Tests for parameter 
constancy can indirectly indicate whether models are not weakly 
exogenous, since parameter estimates which are unstable over time often 
indicate a structural change in the process generating the independent 
variables. To test for parameter constancy, I employed a Chow test.7
A second issue for time series analysis is dynamic specification. 
Time series data are generally not stationary stochastic phenomena. 
That is, the data series are often time dependent, said to be 
integrated or non-stationary. In contrast, a series is weakly 
stationary if its mean and variance are constant over the time period. 
Non-stationary series have damaging statistical consequences, limiting 
the possibility of valid inference. To combat the problem of 
nonstationarity, one can difference the data. Differencing the data, 
however, produces restrictions that limit models to short-term 
representations, ignoring the possibility of long-term relationships 
among variables. Instead, I use the method of cointegration to capture 
long-term relationships and achieve stationarity. Engle and Granger 
(1987) show that variables that are cointegrated can be represented in 
an error correction framework. Therefore, I employ an error correction 
model to capture both short-term and long-term relationships between 
variables. In an error correction model, the dependent variable is 
rendered stationary from a linear combination (in levels) of 
independent variables plus short-term factors. The stationary linear 
combination of independent variables (in levels) represents the long-
term component. 
The empirical model is developed in two stages. First, the long-term 
dynamics of the model are examined and an error correction mechanism is 
determined. Second, a general error correction model is specified and 
then “marginalized” in accordance with Hendry’s reduction theory 
(Hendry 1995). 
The first step determines the long-term dynamics of both 
presidential and prime ministerial approval. According to Dickey–Fuller 
unit root tests, prime ministerial approval, presidential approval, and 
the economic variables (in levels) are nonstationary for the sample 
period (Table 1). Next, I examined whether prime ministerial approval 
and presidential approval were cointegrated with the independent 
variables by regressing the (undifferenced) popularity measures on the 
(undifferenced) independent variables. If the variables are 
cointegrated, the regression coefficients should be significant and the 
residuals stationary. The results indicate that approval ratings for 
both the prime minister and the president are cointegrated with the 
level of unemployment, the level of unemployment*cohabitation, 
elections (presidential and legislative, respectively), and Cresson’s 
tenure in office.8 The static long-run equations, for the prime 
minister’s approval and the president’s approval, respectively, are 
(standard errors in parentheses): 
P.M. Approvalt = 5.74 - 0.96 Unemt + 0.09 Unem*Cohabt + 0.54 Leg. 
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Elec.t - 0.16 Cressont
 (0.20)(0.09)  (0.01) (0.12) (0.06) 
Pres. Approvalt = 5.36 - 0.76 Unemt + 0.17 Unem*Cohabt + 1.1 Pres. 
Elec.t - 0.29 Cressont. 
 (0.44)(0.19) (0.02) (0.46) (0.15) 
These equations serve as the basis for the error correction mechanisms 
(ECMPM, ECMPres, respectively). 
The second step employs this error correction mechanisms (ECMPM, 
ECMPres) in general models of changes in prime ministerial and 
presidential approval. The ECM variables measure how quickly changes in 
approval are “reequilibrated” by the long-run cointegrating 
relationship. The models are:9
∆P.M. Approval = β0 + β 1∆Approval(t-1)  + β 2ECMPM (t-1) + β 3Devaluations + 
β 4 ∆Inflation 
 + β 5 ∆Inflation*Cohabitation + β 6 ∆Inflation*Post-1987 + β 7 ∆ 
Unemployment 
 + β 8 ∆Unemployment*Cohabitation + β 9 Elections + β 10 P.M. 
Appointment 
 + β 11 Administration + ε, 
∆Pres. Approval = β 0 + β 1 ∆ Approval(t-1) + β 2ECMPM (t-1) + β 3Devaluations 
+ β 4∆Inflation 
β 5∆Inflation*Cohabitation + β 6 ∆Inflation*Post-1987 + β 
7∆Unemployment 
β 8 ∆Unemployment*Cohabitation + β 9Elections + β 10 Cresson 
Appointment 
β 11 Cohabitation + ε, 
where ∆ indicates a differenced variable. Since prime ministerial 
approval, presidential approval, and the economic variables are 
differenced, they are stationary. The respective ECM variables are 
stationary as well. 
Following Hendry (1995), the general model is then “reduced,” 
removing variables that do not provide any information to produce a 
more parsimonious model. Valid reduction must not result in a loss of 
information. I make data manipulations based on a number of criteria, 
including: 13 of removed variable, t-statistic of removed variable, 
residual variance, and the Schwarz criterion. Reductions and data 
manipulations are stopped if the Schwarz criterion ceases to move 
toward negative infinity. Three data manipulations are made in these 
models: 
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1. If the variable(s) is not statistically significant, it is 
deleted. 
2. If sequential factors have opposite signs, variables are 
differenced (denoted by Δ in results). 
3. If sequential factors have the same sign, variables are averaged 
(denoted by Σ in results). 
Tables 2 and 3 summarize some of the reductions in the modeling 
process. The final reduced version of the models is reported in Tables 
4 and 5. For the model of prime ministerial approval, the final model 
contains 14 parameters as opposed to 34 in the original model, but the 
“reduced” model is superior in terms of the Schwarz criterion (-4.93 v. 
-3.89) with only a slightly higher residual variance. Similarly, the 
final model of presidential approval includes only 13 parameters as 
opposed to 33 in the original model, while the Schwarz criterion 
improves from -3.38 to -4.56. 
Each model is subjected to a battery of diagnostic tests, including 
tests for serial correlation (Durbin–Watson, Godfrey), 
heteroskedasticity (White), normality (Jarque and Bera), and omitted 
variable bias (RESET). Both models pass all diagnostic tests.10 The 
final model of prime ministerial approval (Table 4) exhibits strong 
goodness of fit (R2 = 0.94; F( 13,33) = 36.749). The residuals 
approximate a normal distribution and are white noise, with no evidence 
of omitted variable bias. The results of the model for presidential 
approval (Table 5) are similar (R2= 0.86; F(12,34) = 17.876). Again, the 
residuals approximate a normal distribution and are white noise with no 
omitted variable bias. Finally, neither model violates weak exogeneity 
conditions. The Chow tests indicate that both models have constant 
parameters. 
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Results 
The results are consistent with the hypotheses. First, for the model of 
prime ministerial approval (Table 4), devaluations had an increasingly 
negatively effect on the government’s approval ratings over time. The 
first Socialist devaluation, in 1981, actually slightly increased 
Mauroy’s approval. The government, however, undertook no restrictive 
measures in accordance with this devaluation. In contrast, the next 
adjustment of the 
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exchange rate parity, in 1982, decreased the government’s approval by a 
relatively small –0.10 of a point. The third devaluation under Mauroy 
in 1983 coincided with the Socialists’ dramatic policy shift to 
economic rigueur. This devaluation resulted in a drop in approval for 
the government of nearly a third of a point. The next devaluation 
(1986) occurred in the period following the legislative elections, 
which returned the center-right to office. The proximity of this 
devaluation to the election appears to have limited the government’s 
accountability for the realignment. The public believed that a more 
realistic parity would give the new government some breathing space to 
implement its economic policies. Finally, the 1987 devaluation again 
had a relatively large negative effect on the government’s approval 
rating, even though most analysts argue that the currency realignment 
was caused by financial speculation. 
Changes in inflation actually have no relationship with the approval 
ratings of Socialist prime ministers. (The variable was deleted in the 
reduction sequence.) During the period of cohabitation, however, 
inflation had a strong negative influence on the popularity of Chirac’s 
center-right government (β = –0.51). For every one-point increase 
(decrease) in inflation, Chirac’s approval ratings dropped (increased) 
by nearly half a point. Interestingly, the domestic reform of monetary 
policy operating procedures had no effect on the prime minister’s 
accountability for inflation. Changes in unemployment also had a short-
term negative relationship with the approval ratings of Socialist prime 
ministers (β = –2.22). The negative relationship between unemployment 
and approval was slightly more negative for Chirac during cohabitation 
(overall coefficient = –2.65). 
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The controls for elections and appointments also provide plausible 
results. Prime ministerial appointments not due to an election boost 
the prime minister’s popularity. Differences in the popularity of 
Mitterrand’s appointments, however, are evident in the results on prime 
minister change. Dummy variables for the appointment of Fabius and 
Cresson were both significant. The effect of appointing Fabius was 
mildly popular on the prime ministers’ approval rating, while Cresson’s 
appointment was extremely unpopular. Interestingly, legislative 
elections did not give a short-run boost to the prime minister’s 
approval ratings. (Again, the variable was deleted in the reduction 
sequence). Instead, legislative elections provided a boost only through 
the long-run component. The coefficient of the ECMPM (β = –0.21) 
indicates that approval returns to equilibrium level relatively slowly—
it takes over five quarters for a shock to dissipate. 
The model of presidential approval has similar results, again 
consistent with the hypotheses. First, devaluations negatively affected 
Mitterrand’s approval rating. The 1981 devaluation had no effect on 
Mitterrand’s popularity. The variable was deleted during the reduction 
sequence. The next two devaluations, however, negatively affected the 
approval rating, as with the results of the prime ministerial approval 
model. The 1982 devaluation had a slightly negative effect on 
Mitterrand’s approval. The 1983 devaluation, however, decreased 
Mitterrand’s approval by almost half a point (β = –0.48), reflecting the 
political consequences of the decision to tighten economic policy in 
conjunction with the devaluation. The 1986 devaluation appears to have 
boosted Mitterrand’s approval ratings slightly. Again, the proximity of 
this devaluation to the period of cohabitation makes interpretation 
difficult. Mitterrand’s approval ratings benefited from cohabitation—
his decision to cooperate with Chirac’s new government made Mitterrand 
appear “presidential.” Consequently, the results from the 1986 
devaluation dummy may reflect public approval of Mitterrand’s behavior 
during the first months of cohabitation. Finally, as expected, the 1987 
devaluation had no effect on Mitterrand’s approval. His decision to 
allow the center-right coalition to control economic policy insulated 
him from the consequences of this devaluation. 
The results on inflation and unemployment are also interesting. 
Mitterrand’s approval ratings had a slightly positive relationship with 
inflation until 1987 (β = 0.15). After 1987, however, the relationship 
between changes in inflation and approval becomes negative (overall 
coefficient = –0.29). Two interpretations of this change are plausible. 
First, the institutional reforms to French monetary institutions might 
have made the government’s monetary policy choices more transparent to 
the public, allowing them to monitor the government’s policies and 
predict their consequences more easily. Alternatively, the public’s 
perceptions of the costs and benefits of inflation might have changed 
over time, as their experience with disinflation within the EMS 
modified their expectations of monetary policy. As with the Socialist 
prime ministers, Mitterrand’s approval ratings also suffered from 
increases in unemployment. In fact, the coefficients are almost 
identical (β = –2.29 for Mitterrand, β = –2.22 for the prime ministers). 
During cohabitation, Mitterrand benefited from Chirac’s inability to 
deal with unemployment. For every one point increase (decrease) in 
unemployment during cohabitation, Mitterrand’s approval increased 
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(decreased) by over three points. In absolute terms, however, 
Mitterrand gained little during cohabitation from unemployment, since 
unemployment remained relatively stable throughout the period, 
fluctuating between 10.2 and 10.7 percent.  
Finally, I included a set of control variables. Surprisingly, 
presidential elections had a negative short-run effect. This short-run 
effect may cancel some of the positive effect elections had on 
popularity in the long run. Mitterrand also received a boost in 
popularity for participating in the cohabitation arrangement. The 
Cresson appointment, however, cost him dearly. The coefficient of the 
ECMPres (β = –0.52) indicates that presidential approval reequilibrates 
relatively quickly after a shock, returning to its long-run path after 
only two quarters. 
Domestic Political Incentives and European Monetary Integration 
The EMS created a policy standard—exchange rate stability—with which 
the public, particularly the domestic social coalitions in favor of 
macroeconomic discipline, could evaluate their governments’ monetary 
policy performance. The results indicate that devaluations negatively 
affect the approval ratings of both French prime ministers and the 
president, even in situations where speculation precipitated a 
realignment, as in 1987. The possibility of electoral punishment for 
violating the standard of exchange rate stability provided governments 
with a short-term political incentive to avoid devaluation. This 
incentive may help explain patterns of monetary policy and exchange 
rate cooperation in the EMS, including the disinflationary success of 
EMS member states, the failure of the system in 1992, and the 
Maastricht plans for a single currency. 
The Disinflationary Success of EMS Member States 
The EMS’s causal role in member states’ macroeconomic performance 
remains a contentious issue. Some political economists argue that the 
EMS functioned as a D–mark zone, helping to bring down inflation in 
member states (Gros and Thygesen 1992; DeGrauwe 1992). Others argue, 
not that the EMS caused disinflation, but that successful domestic 
disinflation programs allowed the EMS to function (Eichengreen 1992; 
Woolley 1992; Fratianni and von Hagen 1992). These political economists 
point to the disinflationary success of non-member states, arguing that 
member states would have brought inflation down regardless of their 
participation in the EMS.11 A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 indicates 
that inflation performance in both EMS and non-EMS countries improved 
in the early 1980s. 
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**  
Figure 2. Average Annual Inflation Rates for Non-EMS European Countries. 
Closer inspection of Figures 1 and 2, however, reveals differences 
in the inflation performance of EMS member states and non-member states 
over the course of the 1980s. In the non-EMS countries, inflation 
increased during the late 1980s, particularly in Spain (prior to 1989), 
the U.K. (prior to 1990), and Sweden. In contrast, EMS member states 
maintained their reduced inflation rates throughout the decade.12 
Clearly, EMS member states enjoyed a more prolonged period of price 
stability than non-EMS countries. 
The structure of the EMS allowed member governments to pursue 
independent monetary policies by allowing for periodic currency 
adjustments. Indeed, during the early years of the EMS, governments 
resorted to devaluations fairly regularly. During the early 1980s, 
however, both increasing capital mobility and the domestic political 
consequences of a devaluation helped enforce discipline on EMS member 
states. As governments learned that devaluations entailed short-term 
political costs as well as costs from the exchange markets, they became 
less willing to resort to the devaluation option, contributing to a 
gradual reduction in the number of realignments in the mid-1980s and 
the eventual hardening of the system in the late 1980s. 
The focal point of exchange rate stability can also help explain the 
prolonged economic discipline of EMS member states in relation to non-
EMS countries. Exchange rate stability provided a focal point for the 
fragile social coalitions in favor of macroeconomic discipline, 
sustaining them over time and across partisan divisions, even after 
inflation had been brought under control in the mid-1980s. 
Consequently, these social coalitions were able to enforce monetary 
policy discipline on their governments by threatening to punish them 
for currency realignments. In countries outside the EMS, the public 
lacked a policy standard to evaluate the Government’s commitment to 
price stability. As a result, once inflation had been brought down in 
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the early 1980s, the social coalitions in favor of macroeconomic 
discipline dissolved. Without the threat of political punishment from 
these social coalitions, governments allowed inflation to creep upward 
in the mid and late 1980s. 
The 1992 EMS Crisis 
After more than a decade of success, the EMS collapsed in 1992–93. 
During the period without any realignments after 1987, a number of 
currencies, including the lira (Italy), the pesata (Spain), and the 
pound (Britain), had gradually become overvalued (Johnson and Collignon 
1994; Gros and Steinherr 1992). Germany’s strategy of monetary 
unification placed extra pressure on the EMS. The generous exchange of 
D–marks for Ost–marks forced German monetary authorities to raise their 
own interest rates to thwart domestic inflationary pressures (Marsh 
1992). Higher German interest rates, however, raised the interest rate 
floor for all the member states, contributing to a prolonged economic 
recession throughout Europe. 
The Maastricht Treaty requirements for transition to the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) also strained the system. The Treaty’s convergence 
criteria required that a member state have no devaluations for at least 
two years to qualify for Stage III. Speculators knew that several 
currencies were overvalued and that a general realignment was imminent 
given the Treaty’s timetable. Consequently, they placed extra pressure 
on weak currencies, making a “one-way bet” that these currencies would 
be devalued. Further, the problems surrounding Treaty’s ratification, 
including controversial public referenda in Denmark and France, created 
uncertainty about the future of monetary union. 
Despite the economic pressures for a realignment (and German 
requests for one), however, member states refused to adjust the values 
of their currencies. I argue that the domestic political costs of 
devaluations may have contributed to the reluctance of member state 
governments to pursue a general currency realignment.13 The twin shocks 
of German monetary unification and the Maastricht Treaty placed member 
state governments in a dilemma between the currency markets and their 
domestic publics. On the one hand, if member state governments had 
pursued a general realignment, the costs in terms of capital flows were 
likely to be temporary, since markets were probably capable of 
recognizing that a realignment reflected extraordinary economic and 
political circumstances. But governments faced the possibility that 
domestic publics, wedded to the focal point of exchange rate stability, 
would be less forgiving and, instead, punish them for devaluing. The 
possibility of currency speculation, however, prevented member state 
governments from justifying a currency realignment to their domestic 
publics in advance of any action. If governments had attempted to 
prepare public opinion for a general realignment, their statements 
would have unleashed an overwhelming wave of speculation in the 
exchange markets. 
By the early 1990s, the perceived political costs of devaluation had 
increased in each of the major EMS member states—France, Italy, 
Britain, and Spain. These governments were already unpopular with the 
public, reflecting, in part, the Europe-wide economic recession. 
Moreover, each government had invested considerable time defending its 
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currency’s parity. An about-face on the issue of devaluation would 
damage the government’s public credibility in the short-term and their 
credibility in the transition to a single currency in the long-term. 
Given that each of the governments was due to hold elections in the 
early 1990s, a currency realignment could have had devastating 
political consequences for these governments—costing them not only 
public approval, but also their positions in office. 
Rather than devalue, governments faced two options: they could 
continue to push up interest rates or they could exit the system. 
Higher interest rates would maintain exchange rate stability with the 
D–mark, but these rates would also contribute to the deepening economic 
recession. Exiting the system, on the other hand, would ease the 
recessionary pressures. Politicians could also use the EMS as a 
scapegoat for the economic slump, possibly helping to defray the 
political costs of breaking their commitment to the system. Exiting the 
system, however, did carry some risks, including higher inflation and 
renewed doubt about the member state’s commitment to the Maastricht 
timetable. Each option—devaluation, maintaining the parity, exit—
carried potential costs. The political circumstances of each government 
determined their decision. 
In Britain, the high interest rates necessary to maintain the parity 
were hurting the Conservatives’ approval ratings by exacerbating a 
private debt crisis. In Britain, government popularity is highly 
sensitive to interest rate changes, since home ownership is widespread 
and mortgages are tied to current interest rates (Clarke and Stewart 
1995; Garrett 1992). Although devaluation might have eased these 
pressures, Prime Minister John Major had assured the markets and the 
public that the government would not devalue, claiming it was his 
intention to make the pound the anchor currency of Europe. A reversal 
on devaluation would have shaken public confidence in his government 
and unleashed criticism from the anti-Europe wing of his own party. 
Instead, exit became the least objectionable option, despite its 
potential costs. Leaving the system allowed the government to lower 
interest rates and spark a recovery. The move also appealed to 
Conservative Euro-skeptics. 
Italy suffered from a public debt crisis. Throughout the early 
1990s, the Italian debt-to-GDP ratio was around 100 percent (von Hagen 
1992). The lira’s weakness in the EMS stemmed, in part, from the 
inability of Italian politicians to address the debt crisis adequately. 
To preserve the value of the lira in the face of market pressure, 
Italian policymakers needed to raise interest rates. At the same time, 
however, higher interest rates worsened the debt crisis—the very reason 
that currency traders were reluctant to hold the lira in the first 
place. The government’s inability to deal with the fiscal crisis 
reinforced the public’s growing resentment of the entire Italian 
political system. A devaluation would have made currency traders 
unlikely to hold lira in the future and reinforced the popular image of 
government incompetence. Instead, exit became the most palatable option 
for the Italian government. The move helped reduce the pressure on the 
Italian economy brought about by the fiscal crisis. 
In contrast, the Socialist government in France chose to remain 
within the system, reflecting both domestic and international political 
calculations. Domestically, the Socialist government could campaign for 
Exchange Rate Stability 19 
the upcoming elections on few other economic successes beside the franc 
fort. Although a currency realignment might have eased the recession, a 
devaluation would have suggested that the hardships endured by the 
Socialists’ constituents had been in vain. Additionally, voters might 
have interpreted a devaluation as a cynical ploy designed to sacrifice 
long-term economic goals for short-term political gains. 
International interests prevented the Socialists from exiting the 
system entirely. Leaving the EMS would have doomed the EMU project and 
insured continued German dominance of European economic and monetary 
policy. French institutional reforms and tight money policies of the 
1980s reflected, in part, a desire to establish France as Germany’s 
equal in European economic affairs. Exiting the system would have 
indicated continued French subordination to German economic leadership, 
making those difficult reforms a failure. France did seek modifications 
in the EMS in the summer of 1993, shortly after the Conservative 
government took office. The Balladur government proposed a widening of 
the exchange rate bands to plus or minus 15 percent. 
Exchange Rate Stability and EMU 
The focal point of exchange rate stability also contributed to the 
development of EMU. First, the domestic political costs of a 
devaluation gave governments another incentive to explore the 
possibility of a single currency. By forcing a devaluation, speculation 
in the currency markets could directly affect government popularity—and 
even governments’ political survival. A single currency would 
neutralize the markets’ ability to influence government popularity in 
this manner by closing the currency markets between EMU countries. 
Second, the EMS established a common policy standard across Europe, 
defining successful monetary policy as exchange rate stability with 
Germany. The acceptance of this policy standard extended a policy 
consensus in favor of macroeconomic discipline across member states, 
eventually serving as the foundation for the Maastricht Treaty 
(McNamara 1995; Sandholtz 1993).14 As a consequence of these factors, 
member state governments began to explore the possibility of a single 
currency in the late 1980s. 
Conclusion 
Domestic social coalitions in favor of macroeconomic discipline 
employed exchange rate stability in the EMS as a focal point for their 
expectations of government policy. Exchange rate stability emerged as a 
focal point, in part, because maintenance of the exchange rate had 
relatively predictable macroeconomic consequences— consequences that 
meshed with the policy goals of these domestic coalitions. Maintaining 
parity with D–mark implied tight monetary and fiscal policies, designed 
to produce more stable inflationary outcomes. If participation in the 
EMS had not had such predictable consequences or if a domestic social 
coalition had not favored those consequences, then governments might 
have been less willing to maintain their commitments to the EMS. 
Exchange rate stability emerged as focal point since it also allowed 
the public to monitor the government’s policy behavior very easily. 
Devaluations and intra-marginal fluctuations signaled the government’s 
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policy stance, particularly in relation to the system’s low inflation 
anchor, Germany. The media focus on devaluations meant that the public 
did not have to scrutinize the government’s policy continuously. In 
contrast, domestic constituents might have found it difficult to 
monitor the government’s commitment with a less transparent indicator. 
The EMS established a policy standard—exchange rate stability—with 
which domestic social coalitions could evaluate their government’s 
economic and monetary policy. By framing the government’s policy 
choices, this policy standard allowed these domestic social coalitions 
to enforce policy discipline on their governments, changing 
politicians’ incentives over monetary and exchange rate policy. The 
results suggest that policy commitments can affect the relationship 
between voters and their elected leaders, making politicians more 
accountable for their policy behavior. 
End Notes
 
 
1. Each currency within the exchange rate mechanism had a central rate, 
defined as the price of that currency in ECUs, a (weighted) basket of member 
state currencies. The ratio of central rates between two currencies served as 
the bilateral rate between currencies. 
2. Italy was an exception to this relatively tight exchange rate band. The 
lira was allowed to fluctuate at plus or minus 6 percent around the central 
rate. Newer entrants to the system, Spain (1989) and Britain (1990), were also 
permitted to fluctuate within the wider +/– 6 percent band. 
3. In contrast, Woolley (1992) suggests that the electorate will punish 
their governments for devaluations since they view international commitments as 
more serious than domestic policy commitments. 
4. Frieden (1994) also recognizes that nontradables were indifferent about 
France’s commitment to the EMS. He argues that support for a fixed exchange 
rate was achieved by linking the issue of monetary integration to further 
European integration. 
5. The prime ministers of France during this period include Mauroy (1981:2–
1984:2); Fabius (1984:3–1986:1); Chirac (1986:2–1988:1); Rocard (1988:2–
1991:1); Cresson (1991:2–1992:1); and Beregovoy (1992:2–1993:1). Although 
conventional accounts claim that the president is the focus of decision making 
in France, Huber (1996) argues that the prime minister strongly shapes policy 
outcomes. This was particularly evident during cohabitation, when Mitterrand 
allowed the Chirac government to determine economic policy. Some observers 
suggest that this experience increased the visibility and prestige of the prime 
minister. The statistical results for Mitterrand and the Socialist prime 
ministers should be similar. 
6. If the reforms have any effect, I expect them to increase the 
government’s accountability for monetary policy, since they increased the 
visibility of the government’s stance on monetary policy. Credit controls made 
it difficult for the public to monitor the policy stance of the government. 
Despite the announcement of anti-inflation policies, the government could 
easily employ exemptions and subsidies to insure that politically sensitive 
groups would not be hurt. Additionally, credit controls provided no clear 
indicator of the day-to-day implementation of monetary policy. The old system 
made the relationship between announced policy goals and policy outcomes 
tenuous. By moving to a market-oriented approach designed to influence interest 
rates, the government became more accountable for their policies and policy 
outcomes. The public could more accurately monitor the government’s policy 
stance on inflation through real interest rates (Granato 1996). Additionally, 
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the reforms created a more direct link between policy announcements and 
inflation, increasing the credibility of monetary policy objectives. 
7. The presence of the dummy variables, particularly near the end of the 
data sample, made the use of recursive residual tests and one and n-step ahead 
forecasting methods infeasible. Since the dummy variables and the constant were 
perfectly collinear, the variance-covariance matrix was not invertible. 
8. According to Dickey–Fuller unit root tests, residuals for both equations 
are significant, indicating stationarity. For prime minister approval, the unit 
root test for the residual is –3.78, rejecting the null hypothesis of the unit 
root at the 0.01 level (critical value = –3.59). For presidential approval, the 
unit root test for the residual is –4.70, rejecting the null hypothesis of the 
unit root at the 0.01 level (critical value = –3.59). 
9. Following Smyth and Dua (1988; Smyth et al. 1991), I also employed 
nonlinear specifications of unemployment and inflation. The results were 
similar to the linear specifications. 
10. Due to the number of regressors in the initial models (kPM =34, kPres =33) 
and subsequent models, the models may be overparameterized, resulting in 
collinearity. None of the independent variables, however, has a correlation 
with another independent variable of more than 0.4. Additionally, I regressed 
unemployment on lags of unemployment and devaluations to see if unemployment 
was endogenous to devaluations. Most devaluations did not have a significant 
effect on unemployment. The 1983 devaluation had a positive, significant effect 
on unemployment, while the 1987 devaluation had a negative, significant effect. 
11. These political economists also argue that, if participation in the EMS 
had enhanced the anti-inflation credibility of member states, then labor 
markets should have adjusted more quickly to tighter monetary policies than 
those in non-member states. But unemployment in EMS countries during the 1980s 
compares unfavorably to unemployment in non-EMS countries. For the period 
between 1981 and 1988, average unemployment in the EMS countries stood at 
around 12 percent. For the sample of non-EMS countries (excluding Switzerland) 
during the same period, average unemployment was around 8 percent. This 
suggests that the EMS did little to dampen the costs of disinflation (DeGrauwe 
1992). 
12. From 198 1–1984, both EMS member states and non-EMS countries had 
similar levels of inflation. Average inflation was 8.7 percent for EMS member 
states and 7.8 percent for non-EMS countries. During 1985–87, both sets of 
countries had brought those levels of inflation down, with the EMS member 
states slightly outperforming the non-EMS countries (3.6 percent to 4.8 
percent). In 1988–1990, the inflation performance of the EMS member states 
remained steady at around 3.4 percent. But the average level of inflation in 
the non-EMS countries crept upward to 5.6 percent. Recent empirical research 
has demonstrated an association between central bank independence and inflation 
performance (Alesina 1989; Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991). The 
average levels of central bank independence for the samples of EMS member 
states and non-EMS member states, however, are virtually identical, reducing 
the possibility that the differences in inflation performance are a consequence 
of domestic policymaking institutions. Using the Cukierman (1992) scale, the 
average level of central bank independence for EMS member states is 0.38. For 
non-EMS countries, the average level of independence is 0.37. 
13. During personal interviews following the September crisis, several 
members of the European Commission complained that member state governments had 
been more concerned with their domestic political standing rather than making 
the adjustments necessary for the survival of the system (Personal interviews, 
Brussels, Spring 1993). 
14. The plans for the transition to EMU recognize the importance of common 
policy standards to solidify the policy consensus underlying the Maastricht 
agreement. Entry depends on compliance with a number of criteria, including 
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convergence of inflation rates, convergence of nominal interest rates, exchange 
rate stability, and limitations on fiscal policies (Buiter et al. 1993; 
Eichengreen 1992). The clear, if economically arbitrary, convergence criteria 
provide the public with a baseline with which to evaluate policy and may frame 
policy choices in a manner, which generates political support for macroeconomic 
responsibility. 
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